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EVOLVING JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD 
Local Government 
Land Use Control* 
Terrance Sandalow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
The year 1967 begins the second 
half-century of zoning in the United 
States. The first comprehensive 
zoning ordinance was adopted by 
New York City in 1916. In the fif-
ty years that have elapsed, zoning 
has become, notwithstanding a 
growing disenchantment with it on 
the part of planners, the most 
widely employed technique of land 
use control in the United States. 
At the present time only Houston, 
of all the major cities in the 
United States, lacks a zoning or-
dinance. And, though I have not 
obtained precise figures, we are 
all familiar with the increasingly 
large per centage of small munici-
palities, many with populations 
less than 5,000, that have adopted 
zoning ordinances. 
Curiously, particularly in view 
of the fact that zoning was largely 
the invention of lawyers, the legal 
profession has until recently, paid 
little attention to the legal prob-
lems of this pervasive control. 
Only in the last dozen years or so 
*This article is based upon a lecture de-
livered at the Institute on Minnesota Mun-
icipal Law and Procedure. 
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have the law schools, for example, 
found a place in the curriculum 
for systematic study of zoning. 
In any event, I think it is fair to 
conclude that this traditional dis-
interest has now ceased. Your 
presence here today is, presum-
ably, sufficient evidence of the fact 
that I need not belabor the point, 
though it might be worth pointing 
out that zoning has achieved the 
ultimate stamp of professional 
acceptance -- West Publishing 
Company has recently incorpor-
ated it as a heading in its digests. 
My assignment today, as I un-
derstand it, is to discuss with you 
evolving judicial attitudes toward 
local government land use con-
trol. Although that subject is 
broader than zoning, encompass-
ing, for example, both subdivi-
sion regulation and the technique 
of official mapping, it seems to 
me desirable to focus exclusively 
on zoning. Important and fascina-
ting questions are raised by these 
other techniques, but in the limited 
time available not everything can 
be covered and since zoning is the 
most widely employed technique 
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of land use control, I think we can 
spend our limited time most prof-
itably by dealing only with zoning. 
I would like to proceed by dis-
cussing first the "traditional" 
view of zoning; traditional in the 
sense that it was the view held by 
the early proponents of zoning, the 
view that under lies virtually all of 
the enabling legislation in effect 
in the United States, and, most 
importantly for our purposes, the 
view underlying the arguments 
used in the early years to sell 
zoning to the courts. After pro-
viding this framework, I would like 
to discuss with you some critical 
issues in contemporary zoning 
litigation and at least some of the 
judicial responses to these issues. 
THE "TRADITIONAL" 
VIEW OF THE PURPOSE 
AND TECHNIQUES OF ZONING 
Zoning, as I have indicated, 
began in 1916, but a public con-
trol of land use began much ear-
lier. The law of nuisance, largely 
developed by courts but with an 
occasional assist from a legis-
lative body, dates back to the early 
days of the common law. From it 
we drew the command -- more 
frequently stated than enforced --
"use your own property in such a 
manner as not to injure that of 
another." That maxim has had, as 
we shall see, some importance in 
establishing the validity of zoning. 
Around the turn of the century, 
legislative enactments controlling 
land use became more common, 
primarily in the large cities. Use 
restrictions were enacted in 
Washington in 1889 and upheld in 
Boston in 1909. Welch v. Swasey, 
214 U.S. 91, (1907). Often, these 
restrictions were uniform 
throughout the municipality, but 
different regulations in different 
districts were not unknown. As 
early as 1799 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court upheld an ordi-
nance prohiting construction of 
wooden buildings in certain popu-
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lous areas of Philadelphia Res-
publica v. Philip Urban Du~, 
2 Yeates 493 (1799), 
The elements of zoning were, 
therefore, neither entirely novel 
nor judicially untested when New 
York enacted its ordinance. What 
was novel about zoning was its 
comprehensiveness. Whereas ear-
lier ordinances attempted to deal 
with relatively limited problems, 
often in only limited areas, zoning 
represented an attempt to control 
land use in substantial detail 
throughout the jurisdiction. It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, par-
ticularly when it is remembered 
that zoning began in the heyday of 
substantive due process, that its 
constitutionality was much in 
doubt. These doubts, as we shall 
see, profoundly affected the 
draftsmen of zoning legislation--
affected them in ways that have a 
continuing importance. But that is 
a matter to which we will return 
later. 
In the decade following adoption 
of the New York ordinance, zoning 
ordinances met with mixed judi-
cial reaction. In some states they 
were upheld; in others they were 
invalidated, but on grounds which 
left open the possibility that valid 
ordinances might be adopted; and 
in others, including Minnesota, 
zoning was held invalid as a de-
privation of property without due 
process of law. There the matter 
stood when, in 1926, the case of 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Real-
ty: Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) reach-
ed the United States Supreme 
Court. By a 5-4 vote, the Court, 
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Suther-
land, upheld the validity of zoning, 
a result subsequently followed by 
virtually all state courts, and in 
the few states in which courts 
balked, by constitutional 
amendment. 
The reas~ning of the Court is 
instructive, for in the time-honor-
ed manner of the profession it 
drew upon an ancient principle to 
sustain the validity of this new 
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regulatory technique. The maxim 
that one ought not use his land so 
as to injure that of another was 
invoked by the Court to define the 
scope of governmental power to 
control land use •. In the Court's 
words, 
''. • • the law of nuisance ••• 
may be consulted, not for the 
purpose of controlling, but for 
the helpful aid of its analogies 
in the process of ascertaining 
the scope of the power." 
The very limited basis upon 
which the Court upheld zoning 
needs to be stressed. Zoning was 
sanctioned not as a device for 
substituting governmental alloca-
tion of land resources for market 
allocation--Mr. Justice Suther-
land was not, in other words, 
sanctioning soc i a 1 i sm. Zoning 
was, in effect, approved as an ex-
tension of private rights in proper-
ty. The government has power to 
protect landowners from an in-
compatible use of neighboring 
property. The common law of 
nuisance did not define the limits 
of governmental power, but it did 
provide the ethical justification. 
The limited basis upon which 
zoning was upheld by Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland cannot be explained 
as the attempt of a conservative 
judge to limit government power. 
In the mid-1920's, shortly before 
the decision in Euclid, the De-
partment of Commerce promulga-
ted a Standard State Zoning En-
abling Act which had been drafted 
by a group of leading zoning law-
yers. Since that act provided the 
model for virtually all state en-
abling legislation, including the 
recently enacted Minnesota sta-
tute, a careful study ofthe Act will 
repay the effort. 
An examination of the Act re-
veals that, although there is an 
occasional phrase _suggesting a 
broader purpose, the draftsmen 
contemplated precisely the same 
role for zoning as was subse-
quently articulated by Mr. Justice 
Sutherland in Euclid, the pro-
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tection of landowners against the 
incompatible use of neighboring 
land. That objective was to be 
achieved by the separation ofwhat 
were thought to be incompatible 
uses. The illustrations discussed 
by the Court in Euclid were, un-
doubtedly, precisely those which 
the draftsmen of the legislation 
had in mind. Thus, Justice Suther-
land justified the exclusion of in-
dustry from residential areas on 
the ground that it would tend to 
prevent street accidents by a re-
duction of traffic and that it would 
decrease noise and other condi-
tions which produce or intensify 
nervous disorders. Similarly, the 
ex c 1 u s i on of apartment houses 
from areas of single family houses 
was justified on the ground that 
their height and bulk interfered 
"with the free circulation of air" 
and monopolized "the rays of the 
sun which otherwise would fall 
upon the smaller homes • • • " 
The Standard Act was based 
upon the assumption that these 
purposes would be achieved by a 
division of the jurisdiction into 
districts, with pre-stated uniform 
regulations applicable to each. 
That is, separationofincompatible 
uses was to be accomplished by 
segregating different categories of 
uses. Commerce was to be separ-
ated from residential areas and 
industry from both ofthese. Often, 
each category was further re-
fined: residential zones, for ex-
ample, were divided into zones in 
which only single family dwellings 
were permitted, zones in which 
single family and duplexes were 
permitted, and zones in which any 
residential use was permissible. 
Of c r u cia 1 importance to the 
scheme of regulation was the fact 
that the regulation applicable to 
each district and the boundaries of 
each district were, as is commonly 
true of legal prescriptions, form-
ulated in advance of any particular 
application for development. The 
system thus assumed that it was 
possible by careful intellectual ef-
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fort to pre-determine to a large 
extent the trend of desired de-
velopment. 
There are two important corol-
laries of this critical assump-
tion. The first involves the re-
lationship of zoning to planning. 
Although it was, of course, con-
templated that zoning regulations 
would be the product of municipal 
planning, it seems fairly clear that 
the Standard Act -- and the state 
acts which followed it -- did not 
express any coherent view about 
the relationship between zoning 
and planning. True, the Act provi-
ded that zoning regulations "shall 
be made in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan ... " but this 
has been interpreted by the courts, 
in line with the apparent intention 
of the draftsmen, as requiring 
merely that regulation be "well-
considered", or "rational", i.e., 
hardly more than the constitution 
would in any event have required. 
See, e.g., Kozesnik v. Township 
of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 
A.2d 1 (1957). 
For most modern planners, 
there is a much clearer rela-
tionship between zoning and plan-
ning -- zoning is merely one of 
the tools of planning , and plan-
ning, ultimately, involves the mak-
ing of a plan, i.e., a document or 
series of documents which by map 
or words or both expresses the 
community's conclusions as to de-
sired patterns of physical develop-
ment. The function of the zoning 
ordinance in this view is to chan-
nel development in the manner 
contemplated by the plan. From a 
lawyer's perspective, it will be 
seen, such a plan would be ex-
tremely useful in ascertaining the 
validity of various decisions made 
in the adoption and enforcement 
of zoning ordinances. But the need 
for a plan to serve such a func-
tion is least when, as contemplated 
by the Standard Act, regulations 
are uniform within a district and 
are relatively inflexible. 
This brings us to the second 
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corollary of the Standard Act's 
assumption that regulation should 
proceed by pre-stated, uniform 
regulation of all land within a 
district. As Professor Mandelker 
has written, ''What is immediately 
striking about the American zoning 
pattern is that the exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion was con-
ceived as a tangential rather than 
an integral phase in administra-
tion. As the ordinances intended to 
solve most land use problems in 
advance, the use of the dispen-
sing power was considered to be 
exceptional rather than the ex-
pected." Mandelker, Delegation of 
Power and Function in Zoning 
Administration, 1963 Wash. Univ. 
L. Q. 60 (1963). The act did, 
however, provide three techiques 
for achieving a degree of flexi-
bility in the administration of 
zoning ordinances. 
First, in language similar to 
that used in section 462.357 of the 
Minnesota statutes, the act pro-
vided for a Board of Adjustment 
authorized to issue variances 
from the terms of the ordinance 
"as will not be contrary to the 
public interest, where, owing to 
special conditions, a literal en-
forcement of the provisions of the 
ordinance will result in unneces-
sary hardship, and so that the 
spirit of the ordinance shall be 
observed and substantial justice 
done." The provision for vari-
ances recognized that general reg-
ulations for districts could not take 
into account instances of particu-
lar hardship based on unique cir-
cumstances. The variance was 
thus a constitutional "safe-
ty valve." 
Second, the act authorized local 
governments to enable boards of 
adjustment ''in appropriate cases 
and subject to conditions and safe-
guards" to make special excep-
tions to the terms of an ordi-
nance "in harmony with its gen-
eral purpose and intent and in 
accordance with general or specif-
ic rules" contained in the or-
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dinance. This is the statutory 
basis for the technique variously 
denominated the "special excep-
tion," "special permit," or "con-
ditional use permit." Early texts 
do not give the device prominence. 
Apparently, it was not thought that 
the device would be widely used. 
Rather, it was intended to provide 
a means for controlling a rela-
tively small number ofuses 
''considered by the legislative 
body to be essentially desirable 
(or essential) to the community, 
its citizenery or to substantial 
segments thereof, but where the 
nature of the use or its con-
comitants (traffic congestion, 
density of persons, noise, ef-
fect on values, safety or health) 
militate against its location at 
every location therein or in any 
location without restrictions or 
conditions tailored to fit the 
special problems which the use 
presents." 1 Rathkopf, The Law 
of Zoning and Planning 54-1 
(1962). 
A third method of achieving 
flexibility under the Standard Act 
was by amendment of the zoning 
ordinance. Thus, the governing 
body can achieve a considerable 
amount of flexibility by multiply-
ing the number of districts, and 
by amendment of the map of the 
zoning ordinances to reclassify 
relatively small parcels. 
Since it was not contemplated 
that any of these devices for 
achieving flexibility would be 
widely employed, the Standard Act 
provided few if any safeguards 
against their abuse. Procedure 
before the Board of Adjustment is 
regulated only minimally. No pro-
vision was made, for example, for 
even so minimal a procedural 
safeguard as a written opinion or 
findings by the Board to justify its 
decision. Inattention to these mat-
ters has, subsequent discussion 
will show, given rise to extreme-
ly troublesome questions. 
With this background, we can 
profitably turn to the critical is-
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sues in contemporary zoning liti-
gation and the evolving judicial 
attitudes toward these issues. 
First, the problem of flexibility. 
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBLE CONTROLS 
Experience has amply demon-
strated the need for deviation from 
uniformity of regulation not only in 
the situations foreseen by drafts-
men of the Standard Act, but in 
other situations as well. Pressure 
for flexible controls exists at 
virtually every point touched by 
zoning ordinances, most acutely 
in areas of change, the largely 
undeveloped areas on the urban 
f r i n g e and decaying neighbor-
hoods, but to some extent in re-
latively stable, developed areas 
as well. 
(a) The Problem in Undeve-
loped Areas 
-Perhaps because it was Ini-
tially devised to regulate land 
use in developed urban centers, 
traditional zoning has been 
somewhat of a misfit in · un-
developed areas. Division of a 
municipality into districts, with 
varying regulations for each 
district, is based upon the as-
sumption that each district has 
unique characteristics discov-
erable by experts which make 
it peculiarly suitable for cer-
tain purposes. The assumption 
perhaps has a certain validity 
in 1 a r g e 1 y developed areas 
where a primary purpose of 
regulation is to protect existing 
uses against encroachment by 
incompatible uses. Occasionally 
it may also be true in unde-
veloped areas, when, for ex-
ample, access to railroads or 
major thoroughfares may make 
certain land particularly suit-
able for industrial or commer-
cial development or scenic vis-
tas may make some land es-
pecially valuable for residential 
development. More frequently, 
however, the land is suitable for 
a variety of uses, at least if cer-
tain conditions are met. Under 
these circumstances, division of 
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the municipality into the tradi-
tional hierarchy of districts may 
create a number of problems. 
Local governments have the 
power to create districts for 
certain purposes, but not the 
power to require developers to 
develop the land for these pur-
poses. In consequence, prema-
ture restrictions may create 
constitutional objections, see 
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. :x_. 
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15N.E. 
2nd 587 (1938), and impede the 
ability of the municipality to at-
tract industry by artificially 
raising the cost of land desig-
nated for industrial purposes. 
Experience suggests also that 
traditional zoning controls are 
not well adapted to large-scale 
integrated development of resi-
dential, commercial, or indust-
rial areas, increasingly the pat-
tern of development in undevel-
oped areas. 
Partly in response to these 
problems, planning theory in re-
cent years has shifted from em-
phasis on a priori classification 
and segregation of "incompat-
ible" uses to emphasis upon the 
mixture of uses and the condi-
tions under which that might be 
successfully accomplished. The 
difficulty of foreseeing all of 
the relevant circumstances and 
the conditions under which var-
ious uses might be mixed have 
inevitably led to a ''wait and 
see" attitude on the part of local 
officials; in other words, to a 
flexible approach to regulation 
not contemplated by the Standard 
Act or enabling legislation pat-
terned after it and for which, 
c on s e q u en t I y , no adequate 
framework was provided. 
(b) The Problem in DeveloP.ed 
Areas 
Inability to impose individual-
ized controls within a district 
prevents the i nt r o duct ion of 
"lower" uses into "higher"use 
districts even though in par-
ticular situations that might be 
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accomplished with no harm --
and perhaps with benefit -- to 
other land within the district. 
The problem is perhaps most 
acute in connection with the 
introduction of commercial uses 
into residential areas, but it is 
familiar in other situations also. 
A landowner desires to open a 
grocery store, or any ofadozen 
other neighborhood retail facili-
ties in a residential district. 
The proposed store would be 
small enough that it would be 
unlikely to bring much traffic 
into the neighborhood or to af-
fect surrounding property ad-
versely in any other way; it 
would be a convenience to res-
idents of the neighborhood. 
Neither a variance or a rezon-
ing of the parcel is technically 
permissible. Rezoning ofthe en-
tire neighborhood as commer-
cial would permit introduction of 
uses less compatible with the 
residential characters of the 
area. A It hough that problem 
might be solved by creation of a 
commercial zone restricted to 
small, retail, convenience fa-
cilities, there remains the 
question whether it is desirable 
to open up the entire neighbor-
hood to commercial develop-
ment and to forego all commun-
ity control over the location of 
the proposed use and the condi-
tions necessary to fit the use 
into a particular setting. 
Related problems are raised 
in "lower" use districts where 
lack of power to impose individ-
ualized controls deprives muni-
cipalities of the ability to cope 
with uses generally permitted 
in a district but which, inapar-
ticular situation, may pose 
special problems. The tradi-
tional view is reflected in Bas-
sett's statement that ''The best 
zoning argument for a new 
theatre permit is that the block 
is already largely occupied by 
theatres." Basset, Zoning 53 
(1940), Diffusion of traffic gen-
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erators may, however, be of 
substantial importance to the 
community, or in s om e sit-
uations, diffusion may not be 
necessary, but the existence of a 
number of traffic generators 
may indicate the necessity for 
imposing conditions upon new-
comers. The difficulty of fore-
seeing all of the situations in 
which the problem may occur 
--e.g., availability of off-street 
parking, character of the sur-
rounding areas, etc.--are likely 
to require that the problem be 
handled administratively if local 
governments are to be enabled 
to deal with it at all. 
JUDICIAL REACTION TO FLEXIBLE 
CONTROL TECHNIQUES 
Local governments have re-
sponded to these problems by using· 
both the devices for achieving flex-
ibility provided by the enabling 
legislation and by inventing some 
devices that were not provided for. 
Judicial reaction to these efforts 
by local governments reveals no 
consistent pattern-- at best we can 
identify what may be trends in the 
litigated cases. 
With respect to variances, an 
impressive series of studies in 
widely separated parts of the 
country establish that anywhere 
from fifty to ninety per cent ofthe 
variances granted by Boards of 
Adjustment (or by councils where 
they have assumed the function) 
are illegal. In general, courts have 
responded with a fairly rigorous 
statement of the c i r cum s t an c e 
justifying grant of a variance. 
The hardship must be substantial, 
it must relate to the land not the 
landowner, and it must be unique 
to a small area of land, not general 
within the district. But since very 
few cases reach the courts, the law 
as defined by courts has not been 
particularly important in practice. 
Closely related is the problem 
posed for the courts by the growing 
use of ''special exceptions". At 
first courts had difficulty in dis-
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tinguishing between variances and 
exceptions. More recently, how-
ever, courts have distinguished the 
two and judicial review has cen-
tered mainly on the adaquacy of 
the standards governing the grant 
of exceptions. Mandelker's review 
of cases shows that "nuisance 
standards" -- negatively phrased 
standards directing that uses not 
be allowed as exceptions if they 
would be incompatible with neigh-
boring land uses -- have been ap-
proved overwhelmingly. 0 r d i-
nances without any standards --
simply authorizing an adminis-
trative board to issue an exception 
-- generally have been held invalid 
delegations of legislative author-
ity. But most zoning ordinances 
posit general welfare standards 
and here judicial reaction is mix-
ed. (Usually the ordinance allows 
the board to permit any of the 
enumerated special uses if such 
action would be in accord with the 
purposes and intent of the ordi-
nance and be conducive to the 
general welfare,) Many cases sus-
tain such standards without any 
critical comment. Some courts 
attempt to evaluate such standards 
and conclude that they are certain 
enough in view of the technological 
complexities of zoning adminis-
tration. A number of cases hold 
such standards unconstitutional or 
ultra vires. Confusingly, courts in 
the same jurisdiction, and even the 
same courts, render inconsistent 
opinions on similar standards in 
different cases. Mandelker, mJ-Rra 
at 74-80; See Annot. Zoning, Dele-
gation of Authority, 58 A. L.R. 2d 
1083 (1958). 
The problems raised by excep-
tions are like those raised by var-
iances. At base is the fear that 
without somewhat concrete stand-
ards landowners will be vulnerable 
to discrimination. In addition is 
the desire to have policy made by 
a representative body and to as-
sure neighborhood status quo. And 
as with variances, courts have not 
been able to take solace in proced-
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ural regularity because enabling 
acts and ordinances have not re-
quired administrative agencies to 
state in detail the reasons for 
granting or denying exceptions. 
An excellent student note in 49 
Minn. L. Rev. at p. 973 argues, 
quite persuasively in my judg-
ment, that two comparatively re-
cent decisions by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court which caused con-
siderable consternation and con-
fusion among municipal attorneys 
and planners are largely the prod-
uct of the court's inadequately ex-
pressed concern with the possibil-
ities for abuse of the special 
permit. I have in mind, of course, 
the decisions in Olson v. City ...2f 
Minneapolis, 213 Minn. 1, 115 N. 
W.2d 734 (1962) and Golden v. City 
of St. Louis Park 266 Minn. 46, 
122 N.W.2d 570 (1963). In each 
case the court invalidated a denial 
of a special permit in a situation 
in which the standards for issuance 
for a permit were either non-
existent or inadequate, and in 
which no reasons were given for 
the decision. On these grounds, the 
court's decisions, if not the lang-
uage of the opinions seems quite 
appropriate, It is true, of course, 
that in each case, it was the coun-
cil that was responsible for grant 
or denial of a permit and that leg-
islative bodies are not normally 
required to state reasons for their 
decisions, nor are standards typ-
ically required to guide them in 
the exercise of the discretion they 
possess. Yet, surely the power 
exercised by the council in each 
of these cases is not a normal ex-
ercise of legislative power, but is 
more akin to the powers typically 
exercised by administrative bod-
ies. Under these circumstances, 
does it not seem more appropriate 
that the safeguards normally pro-
vided against abuse of adminis-
trative power should be applicable 
also when similar powers are ex-
ercised by the governing body? I 
cannot prove, of course, that these 
considerations actually influenced 
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the decision in the Olson and 
Golden cases, but there are straws 
in the wind that suggest the grow-
ing concern of courts with this 
problem. Perhaps the most ar-
ticulate judicial statement was 
that by Mr. Justice Klingbiel of 
the Illinois Supreme Court, con-
curring in the Court's decision in 
Ward v. Village of Skokie, 21 Ill. 
2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962), a 
case which involved the validity 
of a denial by the council of a 
special permit for a motel: 
It is not a part of the legisla-
tive function to grant permits, 
make special exceptions, or de-
cide particular cases. Such ac-
tivities are not legislative but 
administrative, quasi- judicial 
or judicial in character. To 
place them in the hands of leg-
islative bodies, whose acts as 
such are not judicially review-
able, is to open the door com-
pletely to arbitrary government. 
I need not dwell at length on 
the obvious opportunity this af-
fords for special privilege, for 
the granting offavors to political 
friends or financial benefactors, 
for the withholding of permits 
from those not in the good 
graces of the authorities, and so 
on. The rule is familiar enough 
that courts may not inquire into 
the motives or reasons on which 
the legislative body acted. See 
Village of Justice v. Jamieson, 
7 Ill. App.2d 113, 129 N.E.2d 
269. 
It is because of this immunity 
from review that legislative 
bodies must confine themselves 
to the prescribing of general 
rules. If they may undertake to 
confer upon themselves author-
ity to decide what in fact amount 
to in d i v i dual or particular 
cases, the foundations of our 
legal system will fast disappear. 
Concededly it is difficult in 
zoning matters to formulate a 
precise test separating legisla-
tive from ad mini s t r at i v e 
or quasi-judicial functions. For 
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one thing the legislative func-
tion of laying down general rules 
or regulating by district be-
comes less clear cut in its na-
ture as the size of the district 
or the number of people af-
fected decreases. It seems to 
me, however, that there can be 
no reasonable doubt about the 
special permit power with which 
the village attempts to invest 
itself here. Legislation is es-
sentially prohibitory, operating 
by laying down general rules. It 
does not consist in the permit-
ting of conduct or the granting 
of individual relief. Legislative 
bodies are not equiped, except 
in a very broad and general 
way, to ascertain factual ques-
tions which depend upon evi-
dence of individual circumstan-
ces. Their function is not to 
grant permits but to say what 
facts and conditions should war-
rant the granting of permits. 
Stone v. Cray, 89 N.H. 384, 200 
A. 517 (1938). 
What is an application for 
special permit but a particular 
case? The granting or refusal 
of the permit does not lay down 
a rule or prescribe any condi-
tions. It is simply a decision on 
a concrete set offacts, affecting 
the property of particular par-
ties only. It is the nature of the 
proceeding, not the identity of 
the body assuming to act in the 
matter, which should determine 
the n e c e s sit y for standards. 
Otherwise basic constitutional 
protections can readily be cir-
cumvented by the simple expe-
dient of placing quasi-judicial 
functions in a legislative body, 
Very similar considerations are 
involved when we turn from special 
permits to amendments. Amend-
ments to the text of a zoning 
ordinance, norm a 11 y involving 
large areas under multiple owner-
ship, raise no special problem. 
Here the governing body performs 
its traditional, legislative func-
tion. But where the amendment 
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involves only a single parcel or at 
most a few parcels and is adopted 
with reference to a specific pro-
posal for development, the amend-
ment is virtually indistinguishable 
from the special permit device. 
A recent Mary land decision, Hyson 
v. Montgomery County Council, 
242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 587 (1966), 
in recognizing this fact, suggests 
an interesting possibility, that 
persons interested in a proposed 
rezoning of a parcel may be en-
titled to procedures of the type 
normally required in administra-
tive hearings. In view of the coun-
cil's actual role in these situa-
tions, that appears an eminently 
sensible conclusion. 
The most interesting of the re-
cent cases concerning amend-
ments are those which involve so-
called "floating zones". Under 
this technique, the text of the 
zoning ordinance provides for a 
certain type of district, say, light 
industrial. The regulations appli-
cable to the district may be spelled 
out in quite some detail. What is 
unique is that the district is located 
nowhere on the z on i n g map. 
Rather, it is contemplated that a 
developer desirous of developing 
in the manner provided for by the 
regulations applicable to the dis-
trict will apply to the governing 
body for an amendment of the 
zoning map. The governing body 
may then review the application 
and if the proposed development 
is in accordance with the appli-
cable regulations and if the gov-
erning body does not object to the 
development on some other 
ground, it may amend the map to 
permit the development. 
In an extreme application, this 
technique is, obviously, the very 
antithesis of zoning. In Rockhill v. 
Chesterfield Township, 23 N.J. 
117, 128 A.2d 473 (1956), the only 
development permitted of right 
under the zoning ordinance was 
single-family detached dwellings. 
It should not, however, be as-
sumed that this resulted from a 
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decision by the governing body to 
make Chesterfield an entirely res-
idential community. Quite the con-
trary. The ordinance contempla-
ted both commercial and indus-
trial development, but only upon 
grant of a special permit by the 
council. The court held this 
scheme of regulation unauthorized 
by the enabling legislation and 
perhaps unconstitutional. As might 
be anticipated, the opinion relies 
heavily upon the opportunities for 
unjustified discrimination inher-
ent in such a scheme. 
A more 1 i mite d use of the 
"floating zone" technique was ex-
amined in Eves ;:.: ~g Board 
£! Adjustment 2.f Lower G~nedd 
TownshiR, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 
7 (1960).- There the floating zone 
was a "limited industrial dis-
trict". On application by a devel-
oper, the governing body amended 
the zoning map to permit the ''light 
industrial" development in an area 
previously zoned residential. On 
suit by a neighbor to challenge the 
validity of the amendment, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 
the scheme invalid as unauthor-
ized by state enabling legislation. 
The opinion stresses that such a 
system of regulation ''would pro-
duce situations in which the per-
sonal predilections of the super-
visors or the affluence or political 
power of the applicant would have 
a greater part in determining re-
zoning applications than the suit-
ability of the land for a particular 
use from an overall community 
point of view". It relies also upon 
the potential of such a system for 
frustration of the reasonable ex-
pectations of neighboring land-
owners, since they can never know 
whether the "floating zone" will 
someday come to rest next door 
to them. 
Perhaps most significant, how-
ever, is the court's conclusion 
that the ordinance is not, as re-
quired by the enabling legisla-
tion, "in accordance with a com-
prehensive plan": 
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"The adoption of a procedure 
whereby it is decided which 
areas of land will eventually be 
zoned "F -1" Limited Industrial 
Districts on a case by case 
basis patently admits that at the 
point of enactment of ordinance 
28 there was no orderly plan of 
particular land use for the com-
munity. Final determination un-
der such a scheme would ex-
pressly wait solicitation by in-
dividual landowners, thus mak-
ing the planned land use of the 
community dependent upon its 
development. In other words, 
the development itself would 
become the plan, which is mani-
festly the antithesis of zoning 
in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan." 
An interesting contrast to the 
Eves decision is provided by the 
decision of the Maryland Court of 
Appeals in Beall y_. Mo!llgQ!illliy 
County Council, 240 Md. 77 (1964), 
upholding, pursuant to a "floating 
zone" provision, the rezoning of a 
parcel from "single family de-
tached" to "multiple family, high 
rise." The difference in result 
between this case and the Eves 
case can perhaps be explained as 
simply a difference in approach 
between two courts, though this 
would be difficult because the 
Maryland Court traditionally has 
taken a rather restrictive view of 
the power to adopt map amend-
ments. A more interesting possi-
bility is that the cases were deci-
ded differently because of differ-
ences in the two ordinances. The 
ordinance in the Maryland case, 
unlike that in the Pennsylvania, 
contained a careful statement of 
the community's objective in pro-
viding for the floating zone. Al-
though this statement of objective 
did not constitute a "plan," it did 
provide both criteria to guide the 
exercise of the council's discre-
tion and some evidence that the 
"floating zone" was responsiveto 
legitimate planning needs. Both, 
significantly, were emphasized by 
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the court in upholding the "floating 
zone", just as the absence of these 
factors was emphasized by the 
P e n n s y 1 v ani a Court in the 
Eves opinion. 
The meaning of these decisions 
and others that can be cited is, I 
think, that courts increasingly are 
examing zoning ordinances to as-
certain whether they are the prod-
uct of planning. An ordinance or 
action under it which is not a prod-
uct of planning will not necessarily 
fall. If it seems fair in its pro-
cedures and its relationship to 
health, safety, and general wel-
fare is relatively clear, it is likely 
to be upheld even though it is not 
preceded by planning. But there is 
reason to believe that courts are 
beginning to respond more favor-
ably to zoning regulations that are 
a consequence of planning. In Ap-
peal of Key Realty Co. 408 Pa:-98,' 
i82 A.2d 187 (1962), the Penn-
sylvania Court, shortly after its 
dec i s ion in Eves invalidating 
"floating zones", sustained an 
amendment rezoning an areafrom 
"multiple family" to "single fam-
ily". The court stressed that this 
amendment was the . product of 
an overall evaluation by the coun-
cil of land use within the muni-
cipality. 
Lest I be misunderstood, let me 
make plain that I do not read the 
cases as requiring, to sustain the 
validity of a zoning ordinance, 
that a community have adopted a 
master plan. I do think, however, 
that there is evidence that com-
munities which have such a plan 
will fare better in court than 
those which do not, at least ifthey 
can relate the provision under 
attack to the plan. Failing a full-
blown plan, there is evidence that 
courts will respond more favora-
bly to the ordinance if it can be 
shown that it is the product of 
careful assessment by the coun-
cil of all relevant factual data 
and of a policy that has been 
articulated in advance of the lit-
igation or of the particular ap-
plication for development. 
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AESTHETICS 
Let me turn, very briefly, to 
one other matter with respect to 
which new judicial attitudes ap-
pear to be emerging. For a time, 
you may recall, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court seemed unable to 
write a zoning opinion without in-
cluding a statement that zoning 
solely for aesthetic objectives is 
constitutionally impermis-
sible. This is, as you know, an 
accurate statement of the tra-
ditional view in the United States, 
at least if one is to credit the 
language used by courts. There 
is, of course, reason to believe 
that the language never accurately 
reflected the law. Regulation of 
billboards, patently for aesthetic 
purposes, has regularly been sus-
tained by the courts, though fre-
quently they have resorted to such 
fictions as that the regulation was 
permissible because immoral 
practices might occur behind 
billboards. 
In any event, a series of recent 
decisions indicate a growing wil-
lingness on the part of courts to 
give explicit sanction to zoning 
for aesthetic objectives. In1956, 
Mr. and Mrs. Stover, residents 
of Rye, New York, began hanging 
in their front yard a clothesline, 
filled with old clothes and rags, 
as a form of "peaceful protest" 
against high taxes. Each year for 
the next six, since taxes hardly 
ever go down, a new clothesli.ne 
was added. Finally, in 1961, the 
city responded by adopting an 
ordinance prohibiting the erection 
and maintenance of clotheslines 
in front or side yards abutting a 
street. In Peo~ y. Stover, 12 
N.Y. 2nd 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 
(1963), the ordinance was upheld 
by the New York Court of Ap-
peals "as an attempt to preserve 
the residential appearance of the 
city." Stover was followed by 
the Oregon Sup r em e Court in 
OregQ!! Ci!Y y. Hartke 240 Ore. 
35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965), which 
up he 1 d , solely on a e s t h e t i c 
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grounds, the exclusion of auto-
mobile wrecking yards from an 
entire municipality. 
Our time is too short to permit 
a careful discussion of the prob-
lem, but I do want to suggest that 
these cases, particularly Stover, 
reveal the sterility of the longde-
bate about whether aesthetic 
grounds alone can justify exercise 
of the police power. As the New 
York Court said in Stover: 
Once it be conceded that aes-
thetics is a valid subject of leg-
islative concern, the conclusion 
seems inescapable that reason-
able legislation designed to pro-
mote that end is a valid and 
permissible exercise of the po-
lice power. If zoning restrict-
ions which implement a policy 
of neighborhood amenity are to 
be stricken as invalid, it should 
be, one commentator has said, 
not because they seek to promote 
"aesthetic objectives" but sole-
ly because the restrictions con-
stitute "unreasonable devices of 
implementing community pol-
icy." (Dukeminier, Zoning for 
Aesthetic Objectives: A Reap-
praisal, 20 Law & Contemp. 
Prob. 218, 231.) Consequently, 
whether such a statute or ordi-
nance should be voided should 
depend upon whether the re-
striction was ''an arbitrary and 
irrational method of achieving 
an attractive, efficiently func-
tioning, prosperous community 
-- and not upon whether the ob-
jectives were primarily aes-
thetic." 
I think there is little doubt that 
in the years ahead virtually all 
American courts will come to this 
position. The danger, it seems to 
me, is not that the courts will re-
fuse to recognize aesthetics, but 
that is doing so they will fail to 
assure t h at zoning ordinances 
which are adopted in furtherance of 
aesthetic objectives constitute rea-
sonable devices for implementing 
community policy. There are, for 
example, two r~cent cases uphold-
ing ordinances which subject res-
idential development to approval 
by architectural review boards. 
~ ex rel. Saveland Park Hold-
i!!g Corp..: y. Wieland 269 Wise. 
262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955); Reid 
y. Architectual Board Q! Review, 
119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E. 2d 74 
(1963). Such ordinances pose enor-
mous difficulties. The necessarily 
subjective judgments required in 
their administration raise serious 
questions of impartial enforce-
ment. Equally important, they pro-
vide the means for imposing a 
stifling orthodoxy with respect to 
matters of taste. I am far from 
saying that for these reasons the 
ordinances must be held consti-
tutionally infirm, but I do think 
that the courts have not yet begun 
adequately to explore the problem 
or to construct adequate safe-
guards. 
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